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Welcome to Coding Errors.

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Here you will find 100% proof.  Screenshots of Stack Traces, Event Logs, and System Logs tell the story. Charles Fraud was fortunate enough to capture enough to put some vital facts:

TD Ameritrade was operating multiple processes with system privileges throughout the duration of the Schwab Account. 

Large amounts of data were processed by the TD Ameritrade App during this time, likely to pull of the wizardry that is required to begin understanding how specific transactions can be omitted from the record, and account histories reformulated - such as Section D: End of Month Balance Manipulations  (the shortest of all the sections.... if you want to take a quick look).

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Step-by-Step Spoof:

1. Create a fake or modified transaction (e.g., spoofed trade, Bank Sweep, Futures Sweep, anything that could show up on a monthly brokerage statement)

   • Use IPC or database handles that haven’t been invalidated yet

   • Inject the transaction using ContentProvider, Room DB, or shared preferences (depending on app stack)

2. Race the internal logger or onPause() lifecycle

   • The app logs transaction states asynchronously (e.g., to an audit log or SQLite backup file)

   • An attacker ensures their spoofed transaction overwrites the log queue or gets processed before flush

3. Null Pointer Exception or SurfaceFlinger error forces crash / reset

   • An intentional failure resets the UI or IPC layer

   • System never confirms the spoofed data as “tainted” — it’s treated as user-initiated

4. Backend snapshot (e.g., nightly log sync, trading settlement) occurs after spoof

   • Backend pulls from transaction log assuming integrity

   • Spoofed data passes through because no integrity violation is registered

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💼 Why This Works in Financial Systems

• Many trading or banking apps cache data locally before syncing

• The front-end (user device) is the ultimate source that reports user actions

• If you can:​

  • Preemptively flush the data queue

  • Trigger rollback via NPE or surface crash

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➡️ Then the last known state may include the spoofed transaction, which is treated as legitimate.

This becomes extremely powerful in apps that Defer transaction finality to backend reconciliation - which is indeed

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This exactly corresponds to the evidence here, the irreconcilable errors in the financial records ​and the coding.

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The existence of Null Pointer Exceptions is certain, nor is there any doubt regarding the extent of the proof for malicious package deliveries exploiting Samsung Knox, and TD Ameritrade's key role in executing clandestine data access, settings changes, and certain attempts to restore the device settings and arrange final cleanup operations. 

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Several well known exploits were utilized in concert to orchestrate a truly impressive symphony of fraud.  ​​These logs evidence far more than “just a crash.”  Charles Fraud has uncovered deliberate obfuscation techniques, steganographic payloads, and santization routines — concurrent with the theft and other accounting irregularities. 

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🧨 1. Zygote Context Injection / Preload Abuse

Exploit Type: Improper binder permission scoping
Description: Attackers abuse Zygote's preload phase to:

• Hijack service handles before proper UID separation

• Cause misassigned services to run under userId:0

• Break lifecycle ordering so secure components appear uninitialized

 

Relevance here:
The null object reference (.v() on a null com.schwab.mobile.f.a.z) during onActivityCreated() suggests:

• A required object (possibly from a Knox-protected DB or service) was null

• But should have been initialized by the time the Activity was launched

• This is exactly what occurs when SecureFolder or Knox services are invoked too early, too late, or outside their trust contex​​​

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The Crashlogs Report Null Pointer Exceptions Penetrating to the Zygote, and a malicious payload comes on board with system level privileges.  The CMH was the door that was used to inject a payload in an untraceable manner, but it most certainly occurred.  Only TD Ameritrade and Schwab have the source code and internal system logs - probably long destroyed or sanitized - that would explain precisely what data was illicitly exchanged.  This was not an easy thing to do.  There are no other suspects, except of course Schwab secretly blamed Charles Fraud for everything, and it would seem that only something rising to the level of sophistication demonstrated here would get somebody permanently designated on a Lexis-Nexis Bridger Insight Hotlist. 

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In Android or Java systems:

• NPEs often occur when an object or reference is expected to be initialized, but isn’t

• In IPC or binder-based architectures, this happens if:

  • A context (like SecureFolder or Knox) is invalidated mid-operation

  • A component or surface assumes a valid InputConnection or Binder, but it’s invalid or already destroyed - it does not exist.

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In the attack scenario:

The NPE itself isn’t the exploit, but rather a signal that a privileged operation failed uncleanly, leaving the system in an inconsistent state that can be exploited.  In the seconds preceding the crash, malicious payloads are injected and processes are staged to take advantage and escalate privileges to take control of the device in clandestine fashion.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​

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​​​Fiinancial systems involving unauthorized fund transfers, system-level manipulation, and digital cover-up efforts. The timeline begins on February 28, when funds were erroneously deposited into a Schwab brokerage account—likely representing an illicit comingling of institutional assets into a customer account to bypass reporting thresholds or margin constraints.  Immediately afterward, the Schwab mobile app began crashing, system logs showed corrupted image decode attempts, and Samsung Knox Secure Folder—an enterprise-grade containerization tool—was triggered without user interaction.

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These activities coincided with broadcast receivers altering device time settings, input managers resetting UI surfaces, and fragments failing to initialize—strong indicators of intentional tampering and obfuscation of financial data.

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In the weeks that followed, the manipulated account structure persisted in shadow form, causing further crashes, session failures, and transaction anomalies. The TD Ameritrade app, running in the background during key moments, appears to have been used as an interposed vehicle to route or mask these transactions through fabricated margin structures.

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In April, TD Ameritrade crashed their own app resulting in Illegal State exceptions as the hooks were removed from the Schwab App.  Then, in May a final series of crashes completed TD Ameritrade's sanitization of the digital trail.  Attempts to restore application state triggered IllegalStateException and NullPointerException errors—proving the app could no longer reconcile its expected data structure with what remained, so it reverted back to a different time and wiped the slate clean. 

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Charles Fraud presents the full forensic timeline, screenshots, logs, and analysis that collectively expose the use of secure containers, timestamp manipulation, and data corruption to hide, exploit, and ultimately erase the evidence of financial misconduct.

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Null Pointer Exceptions lead to Java Runtime Exceptions causing Schwab Mobile App to Repeatedly Crash on these documented instances and others:

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February 28

March 1

March 3

March 6

March 18?

March 21

March 23

April 2

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TD Ameritrade's app also crashed - specifically due to Illegal State Exceptions - a couple months after the account was supposedly closed.  The timing is quite peculiar because the last series of crashes occurred right when the 90 Day Cash Freeze period was due to end.  Curiously, $10 Million was erroneously appeared in the account, revealing that some error occurred as apparently my account was targeted from day one at Schwab.  How?  Well, my TD Ameritrade account was relentlessly targeted for over a year, and if you're interested in further details regarding why my account would have been a good target, read more about the conspiracy here.  The jist of it is this: TD Ameritrade had good reason to want to discredit and distract me.  When the $10,000,000 deposit occurred, all of a sudden Schwab and TD Ameritrade shared the common goal of wanting to discredit and distract me.  So the same machinery that was put in place to launder the $10,000,000 deposit thus continued to be utilized to steal and cheat - hiding money and transaction data.   

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A pattern of crashes and other unusual app behavior coincided with the "erroneous" accounting in my Schwab accounts.  The coordinated exploitation of Schwab's systems financial systems involved system-level manipulation, clandestine usage of secure folders, digital cover-up efforts and, shockingly, TD Ameritrade - supposedly a competitor of Schwab at the time.

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t first, Schwab acknowledged that a deposit occurred, then insisted that no deposit or error occurred, then insisted a system issue indeed had occurred, then flip-flopped once again and settled on their current stance that no errors occurred, and no deposit occurred either.  Also, my account became restricted due to a supposed "free-ride" of a non-marginable security (purchasing assets without having settled cash in the account) - but this simply could not have occurred because the transactions at issue were the first purchases in the account, which could not occur until my initial deposit became available.  This was my first clue that there were issues regarding timekeeping.

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The $10 Million that was deposited was not my money, but I was certainly curious especially upon receiving notification that a transfer into the account indeed had occurred.  Apparently, these funds were brokerage assets - belonging to Schwab or some other  third party abusing Schwab's systems to avoid position limits that are in place - in large part - to prevent unfair asset manipulation by market makers. (See also: Disciplinary Action documenting how J.P. Morgan misreported Short Positions for over a decade).  By comingling assets in a client's account and executing the transactions there, so too can fraudsters skirt the regulatory reporting requirements. 

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So how could brokerage assets be comingled in retail investors' account without their knowledge is a challenge?  Well, this is precisely what the Whistleblower Files Sections A explains in great detail.  In my case, it was the Futures Account that was made available by comingling the Futures trading and accounting with the Brokerage Account's margin accounting.  A Futures account is not needed, however, because even a regular brokerage account has several sub-accounts that can be creatively partitioned to facilitate comingling (e.g. Cash Account, Margin Account, Short Account, Bank Sweep Feature).  See the Whistleblower Files for more details about all of this.

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Here, the focus​​​​​​​​​ the crashes of my Samsung smartphone running Android 7.0.  There were several critical vulnerabilities that were exploited:

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Obviously, there are no good answers, so Schwab denied that a transfer even occurred and let loose a vicious gaslighting and racketeering campaign to distract and discredit me.  

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 Million was   when funds were erroneously deposited into a Schwab brokerage account—likely representing an illicit comingling of institutional assets into a customer account to bypass reporting thresholds or margin constraints. Immediately afterward, the Schwab mobile app began crashing, system logs showed corrupted image decode attempts, and Samsung Knox Secure Folder—an enterprise-grade containerization tool—was triggered without user interaction. These activities coincided with broadcast receivers altering device time settings, input managers resetting UI surfaces, and fragments failing to initialize—strong indicators of intentional tampering and obfuscation of financial data.

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In the weeks that followed, the manipulated account structure persisted in shadow form, causing further crashes, session failures, and transaction anomalies. The TD Ameritrade app, running in the background during key moments, appears to have been used as an interposed vehicle to route or mask these transactions through fabricated margin structures. By May, the digital trail collapsed entirely: attempts to restore application state triggered IllegalStateException and NullPointerException errors—proving the app could no longer reconcile its expected data structure with what remained. This site presents the full forensic timeline, screenshots, logs, and analysis that collectively expose the use of secure containers, timestamp manipulation, and data corruption to hide, exploit, and ultimately erase the evidence of financial misconduct.

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The error logs show a repetitive pattern of crashes due to Null Pointer Exceptions - essentially the system was looking for data that was supposed to exist in a specific location but it was not there.  If there are timing issues, or otherwise if Null Pointer exceptions is 

2. Rare Timing Issue (Race Condition)

• Something like:

  • z is expected to be initialized before the fragment starts.

  • But due to slow I/O, network delay, or threading issue, it’s still null when accessed.

• Happens only on slower devices, low memory, or weird lifecycle behavior (e.g., backgrounding too fast).​​​​​

• A critical object (e.g. account info or session token) might be stored in SharedPreferences, SQLite DB, or cache and became null, malformed, or expired.

• App expected the object to be initialized, but it wasn’t — only for this user.

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TD Ameritrade’s account was utilized as an interposed shadow structure.

• By linking or masking it as a margin sub-account under Schwab, the actors:

  • Exfiltrated funds in a way that avoided triggering real-time audit flags.

  • Made trades appear as margin-based positions, which can obscure actual fund flows.

• This fabricated margin relationship likely allowed for rapid liquidation or hidden accumulation of positions without standard reporting.